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COMMENTS
WHEN IS IT NECESSARY FOR CORPORATIONS TO BE
ESSENTIALLY AT HOME?: AN EXPLORATION OF
EXCEPTIONAL CASES
INTRODUCTION
This comment examines the current state of the law surround-
ing the exercise of general jurisdiction and forecasts the circum-
stances under which the Supreme Court is likely to clarify its re-
cent decisions. Its purpose is to explore the principles announced
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler
AG v. Bauman and consider whether the due process rationales
offered in the past coincide with the new essentially at home
standard imposed for general jurisdiction. Moreover, this com-
ment analyzes the reactions of the lower courts in the wake of
these decisions and predicts where the Supreme Court is headed
in cases involving foreign' corporations. The recent decisions pri-
oritize predictability for the defendant above rationales offered in
the past. The Court left open a small opportunity for discretion,
but has stopped just short of establishing a bright-line rule. Thus,
lower courts must try to identify what exceptional hypothetical
facts are necessary to exercise general jurisdiction over a corpo-
rate defendant outside of its principal place of business and state
of incorporation.
There are occasions when a plaintiff may decide to bring a suit
in a state other than where the cause of action arose. Whether it
be the plaintiffs home state or a location that has favorable laws,
general jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to make that choice. Such a
1. In jurisdiction analyses, the term foreign often refers to out-of-state corporations.
Here, and throughout this comment, the term foreign refers to corporations that are based
in a nation other than the United States.
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circumstance could arise if a plaintiffs injury occurs outside of
the United States. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's
contacts with the forum state are so sufficiently substantial that
suit may be brought against him in that state, despite the dis-
pute's lack of relation to those contacts.2 Accordingly, the proper
analysis for the exercise of jurisdiction considers the "relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."3
Part I of this comment reviews the historical background of
personal jurisdiction and introduces the varying rationales of-
fered over time from the members of the Supreme Court. In Part
II, the Court's most recent decisions are explored in depth, and
lower courts' interpretations and applications of the essentially at
home standard are evaluated. Part III analyzes the validity of the
possible policy justifications for the recent decisions in light of ra-
tionales offered in the past. Finally, Part IV predicts the circum-
stances under which the Court may rule that a defendant's con-
tacts are sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction and
suggests that the predictability rationale will govern the law of
general jurisdiction.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Personal jurisdiction has an extensive history, and the back-
ground is vital to understanding modern jurisprudence. Begin-
ning with the traditional bases for jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court revealed its rationales when applying these standards to
corporations. International Shoe Co. v. Washington introduced
the minimum contacts test and several decisions have refined
how the doctrine is applied today.
2. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1984). General jurisdiction is also referred
to as all-purpose jurisdiction. Walter W. Heiser, General Jurisdiction in the Place of Incor-
poration: An Artificial "Home" for an Artificial Person, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 631, 636 (2016).
The Supreme Court began referencing the distinction between the two types of analyses
using the current terms-general and specific-in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.
A v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984); and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 473 n.15 (1985). The terms, and the distinction between them, rapidly became essen-
tial to the personal jurisdiction analysis.
3. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 (1977).
[Vol. 51:11791180
EXPLORATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CASES
A. Presence and Consent: Traditional Bases for Jurisdiction
Historically, courts determined whether the exercise of person-
al jurisdiction was proper based on voluntary appearance, con-
sent, or physical presence in the forum. Courts did not distin-
guish between specific jurisdiction and general, or all-purpose,
jurisdiction.4 Indeed, courts applied the same analysis whether
the cause of action arose in the forum state or elsewhere.5 Even
before rules for testing the validity of a court's jurisdiction were
established, early cases indicate the Supreme Court struggled
with determining proper jurisdiction when claims involved corpo-
rations.' The difficulty arises because corporations are fictional
entities without a simple measure for domicile other than state of
incorporation, but the Court recognizes that corporations' power
reaches beyond state borders.'
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court struggled with
the extent to which a corporation could engage in activities out-
side of its state of incorporation. For example, in Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, the Court held that the plaintiff, a bank incorporated in
Georgia, had the ability to enter into a valid contract in another
state.8 Accordingly, the bank also had the right to sue to recover
pursuant to that contract.9 The bank brought suit in Alabama
against a citizen of Alabama. ° The Court revealed its early con-
cerns with corporations engaging in activities outside of their
states of incorporation, stating that a corporation "must dwell in
the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereign-
ty. But although it must live and have its being in that state only,
yet it does not by any means follow that its existence there will
not be recognised in other places.""
Similarly, in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, the Court held
that a judgment handed down by a court in Ohio was enforceable
4. Heiser, supra note 2, at 636.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 636-37.
7. See id. at 637.
8. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 585, 597 (1839).
9. See id. at 597.
10. Id. at 521.
11. Id. at 588.
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against an Indiana insurance company.12 Lafayette Insurance
conducted business in Ohio pursuant to a state law that recog-
nized a corporation's existence for purposes of entering into con-
tracts there and subjected them to suit through notice to its
agents.1 A registered agent of Lafayette was notified of the suit,
but Lafayette failed to appear in the Ohio court."' Thus, a default
judgment was handed down in favor of the plaintiff.5 When the
plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment against Lafayette in In-
diana, the defendant argued that the Ohio judgment was invalid
due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 6 In holding for the plaintiff,
the Court reasoned that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper
because Lafayette engaged in business in the forum state, its
agent received service of process, and the dispute arose from a
contract involving a citizen of Ohio." Here, jurisdiction was prop-
er because the defendant consented to service of process in Ohio."
In deciding Pennoyer v. Neff, approximately twenty years later,
the Court began to analyze personal jurisdiction in terms of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 This case
did not involve a corporation, but was a significant step in the
evolution of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The interstate
federalism rationale for personal jurisdiction finds its origin in
this opinion." The Court also considered presence in the forum as
a traditional basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.2 ' The Pennoyer
Court said that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. ' '2  It
follows that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authori-
ty over persons or property without its territory."2
The Court held that a default judgment from an underlying ac-
tion was invalid because the judgment was rendered when the
12. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855).
13. Id. at 406.
14. See id. at 407.
15. See id. at 405.
16. Id. at 405.
17. Id. at 408.
18. Id.
19. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
20. See id. at 722.
21. Id. at 734.
22. Id. at 722.
23. Id.
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plaintiff was not personally served with process, did not appear in
the case, and was not a resident of the state.24 Thus, the subse-
quent sale of the property in controversy was not authorized.2"
The Court reasoned that personal jurisdiction was based on the
mutually exclusive sovereign power of the sister states over per-
sons and property within its borders, stating that "[t]he several
States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence
of one implies the exclusion of power from all others."26 According-
ly, jurisdiction was not proper in the underlying action when the
defendant was not present in the forum.2 7 The Court articulated
that the analysis would be more complicated if a corporation were
involved, but that question was not before the Court in Pennoy-
28
er.
Likewise, in Flexner v. Farson, the Court held that a Kentucky
judgment was void against Illinois defendants because the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in the underlying dispute was improper.29 De-
fendants were doing business in Kentucky through an agent in
the state." The defendant's formal agent was served after the
agency relationship had ended. 1 The defendants failed to appear
in Kentucky, and a judgment was rendered against them.2 The
plaintiffs brought an action in Illinois to enforce the judgment.2
In affirming the Illinois lower courts, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that Kentucky lacked authority to require individuals to
register agents within its borders in order to do business. 4 Thus,
service on the former agent did not constitute presence to allow
jurisdiction in Kentucky over the nonresident individuals. 5
At this point in history, the law restricted where defendants
could be sued based on voluntary appearance, consent, or physi-
24. Id. at 734, 736.
25. Id. at 734.
26. Id. at 722.
27. Id. at 734.
28. Id. at 735-36.
29. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 292-93 (1919).
30. Id. at 292.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 293.
35. Id.
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cal presence in the forum. 6 During this time, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the interstate federal-
ism rationale provided the foundation for such restrictions.
B. Origin of Minimum Contacts
The Supreme Court addressed whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a corporation was proper in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.7 This decision established the minimum con-
tacts test, which replaced Pennoyer's territorial presence test.3s
The Court held that a shoe company incorporated in Delaware,
with its principal place of business in Missouri, was amenable to
suit in Washington in a case involving nonpayment of unemploy-
ment taxes for the salesmen employed in the forum.39 The Court
explained that jurisdiction was proper in any state where a corpo-
rate defendant conducted continuous and systematic business ac-
tivities." The holding justified the minimum contacts test, apply-
ing a fairness rationale rather than the interstate federalism
rationale abided by in Pennoyer.4"
The Court reasoned that "due process requires only that in or-
der to subject a [nonresident] defendant to a judgment ... he
have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'42 The opinion also articulated
for the first time a distinction between causes of action that arise
in the forum state and those that arise elsewhere. 3 Although the
36. See generally, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (physical presence or
voluntary presence); Lafayette Insur. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855) (consent);
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 597 (1839) (physical presence of a corporation).
37. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
38. See id. at 316; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
39. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313, 321.
40. Id. at 326.
41. See id. at 320.
42. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
43. That is, the Court articulated a separate analysis for general, or all-purpose, ju-
risdiction where the cause of action did not arise in the forum state.
While it has been held... that continuous activity of some sorts within a
state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable
to suits unrelated to that activity,... there have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.
1184 [Vol. 51:1179
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Court decided this case based on a specific jurisdiction analysis
because the cause of action arose from International Shoe's con-
tacts with Washington, it also explained that where corporate op-
erations within a state were so substantial and continuous, per-
sonal jurisdiction is proper for "causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities."" Thus, the Court
established that, according to the minimum contacts test, the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant would be proper
in any state where the corporation carries out continuous and
systematic business activities.45
C. Development of Minimum Contacts
Between 1945 and 2011,46 the Supreme Court handed down on-
ly two opinions applying the minimum contacts test in a general
jurisdiction context.47 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., the Court held that the Ohio court could exercise jurisdiction
over a shareholder's claim against a Philippine mining company
that had moved its office to Ohio during World War II.48 Indeed,
Perkins is an uncharacteristic case because the Ohio state courts
concluded they did not have jurisdiction over the foreign corpora-
tion, but the Supreme Court ruled the state did indeed have the
49power.
The Court explained that the company's continuous and sys-
tematic in-state activities, including "directors' meetings, busi-
ness correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of sala-
ries, [and] purchasing of machinery," satisfied the level of
contacts necessary to comply with due process." The Court rea-
soned that the state of Ohio was the defendant's primary, though
temporary, place of business during wartime; thus the exercise of
Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 318-320.
45. See id. at 318.
46. These dates represent the span of time between the decision in International Shoe,
which was based on minimum contacts, and the opinion formulated by the Court in Good-
year, in which the analysis shifted to an essentially at home analysis. See id.; Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
47. PETER HAY ETAL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 409 (5th ed. 2010).
48. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438-39, 447-48 (1952).
49. Id. at 448; HAY ET AL., supra note 47, at 409.
50. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-46.
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jurisdiction was fair. 51 Accordingly, even though the shareholder's
claim arose elsewhere and the corporation was incorporated in
the Philippines, it was amenable to suit in Ohio. 2
On the other hand, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.
A. v. Hall, the Court considered the level of contacts a Colombian
corporation had with a forum state and decided those contacts
were insufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation for a
claim unrelated to the contacts. 53 A wrongful death action was
brought against the helicopter charter service in Texas, arising
from a helicopter crash in Peru involving Americans. 4 The trial
court found for the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed, arguing
that the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction. Eventually,
the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that jurisdiction was proper."
Helicopteros petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that it
lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to be amenable to suit in a
claim that arose outside the forum and was unrelated to its Texas
contacts.57 The Court reversed the holding because Helicopteros's
contacts were insufficient for the Texas court to exercise general
jurisdiction. 8 Helicopteros's activities in Texas included making
purchases, sending staff for training, drawing payments from
Texas banks, and attending the negotiation session for the char-
ter service with the employer of the deceased. 9 The Court ex-
plained that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular inter-
vals, [were] not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of
action not related to those purchase transactions."
51. Id. at 448. 'The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one
of general fairness to the corporation." Id. at 445.
52. Id. at 439-48.
53. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409, 416 (1984).
54. Id. at 410.
55. See id. at 412.
56. Id. at 412-13.
57. Id. at 409.
58. Id. at 418-19.
59. Id. at 416.
60. Id. at 418 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518
(1923)).
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D. Jurisdiction Rationales of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court revealed varying jurisdiction rationales in
Burnham v. Superior Court." While the minimum contacts analy-
sis was not reached in this case, it is important to note the justifi-
cations offered by the Justices for empowering a particular forum
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. 2 The Court could not
agree on a majority opinion; however, all members of the Court
agreed that due process did not bar the state's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant when he was served while
temporarily in the forum state.63
Justice White wrote separately to articulate his view that be-
cause presence as a basis for personal jurisdiction had been so
widely held for an extensive period in history and had not in that
64time been held unfair, the Court need not change the status quo.
This long history, he elaborated, allowed potential defendants to
predict when they would be amenable to suit.6 He implied that a
different analysis may be conducted in a case where the defend-
ant is not in the forum intentionally or voluntarily.6 Justice
White's concurrence illustrates the importance of the predictabil-
ity rationale.67 Similarly, Justice Stevens thought it was sufficient
to rely upon history in his concurring opinion, along with the im-
portance of fairness in exercising personal jurisdiction in a par-
ticular forum. 8
Justice Brennan authored a concurring opinion to express his
view that history is not controlling when determining whether a
61. See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (including a plural-
ity and three concurrences).
62. See id. at 619. The plurality opinion expressed a return to the interstate federal-
ism rationale, stating that although International Shoe established that a "defendant's
litigation-related 'minimum contacts' [with a state] may take the place of physical pres-
ence as the basis for jurisdiction," nothing in the case law supports the proposition that "a
defendant's presence in the forum is not only unnecessary to validate novel, nontraditional
assertions of jurisdiction, but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction." Id. at
618-19. The opinion reasoned that due process was satisfied by the defendant's presence
in the forum. Id. at 619.
63. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring); id. at 628-29 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at
640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction rule satisfies due process." Moreover, he explained
that the analysis must be conducted in light of contemporary no-
tions of due process. Presence is generally sufficient to satisfy
due process because, by travelling to the forum, the defendant re-
ceives benefits from the state and it would be improper to allow
him to be immune from the authority of that state as a defend-
ant.7' Here, the justification articulated was the reciprocal bene-
fits and burdens rationale. 2
The rationales offered in the concurring opinions in Burnham in-
clude predictability,73 fairness,74 and reciprocal benefits and bur-
dens.7" Only one of these justifications endures in the new essen-
tially at home standard for personal jurisdiction: predictability.76
II. ESSENTIALLY AT HOME
The essentially at home standard was first articulated in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown in 201177 and
was applied in Daimler AG v. Bauman in 2014.78 The Supreme
Court articulated that the appropriate test for asserting jurisdic-
tion over a corporation is whether its connections with the forum
state are so "continuous and systematic" as to render it "essen-
tially at home" in the forum.7 9 Also in 2011, the Supreme Court
handed down a fractured opinion in a specific jurisdiction case, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. ° The Court's rationales re-
veal the varying views among the Justices about jurisdiction
69. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 630.
71. See id. at 637-38.
72. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1013 (2012) (discussing reciprocal benefits and burdens as a compo-
nent of fairness).
73. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. See id. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
77. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) ("A
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corpora-
tions to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.").
78. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 ("Instructed by Goodyear, we conclude Daimler is
not 'at home' in California.").
79. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
80. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011),
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overall, and offer insight into how the Justices analyze general
jurisdiction."' Goodyear Dunlop introduced the origin of the essen-
tially at home standard that was developed three years later in
Daimler. J. McIntyre provides the jurisdiction rationales of the
Court in the context of specific jurisdiction exercised over a for-
eign corporation. Today, lower courts are interpreting and apply-
ing the essentially at home standard.
A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the foreign defendants
were not amenable to suit in North Carolina for claims unrelated
to their activities in the state.82 The wrongful death action which
arose from a bus accident that occurred near Paris, France, al-
leged that the accident was caused by a defective tire distributed
by Goodyear subsidiaries and manufactured in Turkey by another
subsidiary." The case was brought in North Carolina, the home
state of the deceased, against Goodyear and its foreign subsidiar-
ies. 4 Goodyear's subsidiaries' contacts with the forum consisted of
a small percentage of its tires regularly sold in North Carolina.85
In holding for the defendants, the Court explained that sys-
tematic and continuous activities are essential to exercise general
jurisdiction, but are not necessarily sufficient alone. 6 Indeed, the
Court clarified that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a cor-
porate defendant is improper when based solely on the defend-
ant's regularly occurring sales in the forum. 7 Rather, the Su-
preme Court articulated that the appropriate test for asserting
jurisdiction over a corporation is whether its connections with the
forum state "are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum state."8
81. See generally id. (including a plurality, a concurrence, and a dissenting opinion).
82. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 917-18, 920.
83. Id. at 918, 920.
84. Id. at 918.
85. Id. at 921 ("mens of thousands out of tens of millions manufactured [in North
Carolina] between 2004 and 2007.').
86. Id. at 927.
87. Id. at 930-31 n.6.
88. Id. at 919.
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Moreover, the Court explained that the "paradigm forum[s] for
the exercise of general jurisdiction" are where the corporation is
incorporated and where it has its principal place of business.89
While the Court did not hold that the paradigm forums are the
only available forums in which to bring suit against a corporate
defendant, some commentators anticipate the Court is moving
toward holding that corporations are amenable to suit for causes
of action arising outside the forum in only two states: the state of
incorporation or the state of a corporation's principal place of
business, which can be the same state in some instances.9" The
principal place of business is "the place where a corporation's of-
ficers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities."91
The Supreme Court stopped just short of ruling that the para-
digm forums are the only available forums; however, it remains to
be seen what exceptional systematic and continuous contacts are
necessary for the defendant to be ruled essentially at home.
This standard appears to be narrower than the systematic and
continuous contacts test articulated in International Shoe and
applied in Perkins. For instance, the Court stated that jurisdic-
tion cannot be based solely on sales in the forum state, as the de-
fendant in Goodyear maintained sales in North Carolina.92 In re-
versing the judgment of the state court, the Goodyear Court
determined that the foreign subsidiaries were not amenable to
suit in North Carolina because their connections fell short of the
continuous and systematic contacts necessary to empower the
state to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to those
contacts.93
B. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
In J. McIntyre, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction was proper over a foreign defendant who sued
89. Id. at 924.
90. See id.; see, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
101, 105-06 (2015).
91. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 77, 92-93 (2010) (interpreting the federal di-
versity jurisdiction statute). Some disagree whether this definition applies in a personal
jurisdiction context rather than a citizenship context. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra
note 90, at 148-49.
92. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929.
93. Id. at 920.
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in the forum where the injury occurred.94 Thus, Justice Ginsburg
conducted an analysis for specific jurisdiction and offered ration-
ales for exercising jurisdiction that could help justify the outcome
in Goodyear, even though the latter dealt with general jurisdic-
tion." Overall, the holding was six to three in favor of the defend-
ant, striking down the exercise of personal jurisdiction.96
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas.97 The opinion ex-
plained that due process requires that a defendant submit to the
state's authority in order to exercise jurisdiction over the defend-
ant corporation.98 Accordingly, it was "not enough that the de-
fendant might have predicted that its goods [would] reach the fo-
rum State."'9 Rather, the defendant must target the forum to
make it amenable to suit there."' Targeting can be inferred by a
submission to the benefits of a state.' That is, the "defendant
must 'purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."" 2 The opinion downplayed the considera-
tion of fairness and focused instead on the importance of the de-
fendant purposefully availing itself of the forum, which provides
greater predictability for the defendant." 3 The reciprocal benefits
and burdens rationale also remained important in the Court's ju-
risdiction analysis.'
Justice Breyer's concurrence was joined by Justice Alito."'
They wrote separately to articulate a narrower holding.0 6 They
agreed that the exercise of jurisdiction was improper, but their
94. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011).
95. See id. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Note that Goodyear was a unanimous
holding whereas in J. McIntyre, the Justices could not achieve a majority. Goodyear, 564
U.S. at 917; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877.
96. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877, 887, 893.
97. Id. at 877.
98. Id. at 879-80.
99. Id. at 882.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
103. See id. at 882-83.
104. See id. at 882.
105. Id. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring).
106. Id.
2017] 1191
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
reasoning was based on due process precedent alone."°7 They took
issue with the plurality's "broad pronouncements that refashion
basic jurisdictional rules." ' In particular, the facts of the case did
not present issues arising from recent changes in commerce and
communication, making it "unwise to announce a rule of broad
applicability without full consideration of the modern-day conse-
quences."'09
Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent and was joined by Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan."0 They expressed concern that a
foreign manufacturer can indiscriminately sell to the United
States with no particular state in mind, but rather with an objec-
tive "to sell as much as it can, wherever it can" and not be ame-
nable to suit in a state where its products end up. "' They explain
that to be fair to people who are injured by those products sold,
the determination of jurisdiction requires consideration of the
burden to the defendant, the convenience to the plaintiff, and the
forum state's interest.112 The dissent articulated that a balancing
test that considers fairness to each party is necessary to deter-
mine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is proper."'
C. Daimler AG v. Bauman
Daimler AG v. Bauman is the first Supreme Court case that
tested the essentially at home standard for general jurisdiction
articulated in Goodyear."4 The Court unanimously held that the
forum state could not exercise jurisdiction over an Argentinean
corporation for claims arising outside of the forum. 1 1 ' Twenty-two
residents of Argentina filed suit in a California court claiming
causes of action pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, California law, and Argentina
law.1 The plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a
107. Id.
108. Id. at 890.
109. Id. at 887.
110. Id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 893.
112. See id. at 903-04.
113. Id. at 909-10.
114. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
115. Id. at 750-51.
116. Id.
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subsidiary of Daimler, collaborated with state security forces dur-
ing Argentina's "Dirty War" to "kidnap, detain, torture, and kill"
employees of Mercedes-Benz Argentina, including the plaintiffs or
persons closely related to them. 117 Plaintiffs asserted that person-
al jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California con-
tacts of Daimler's subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA."' Mercedes-
Benz USA was incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of
business was in New Jersey."9
The defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion.'2 ' The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction over Daimler was
proper based on Mercedes-Benz USA's contacts with California,
including a regional office and other facilities located in the state
and its position as the largest retailer of luxury vehicles in the
California market. 2 ' The district court granted Daimler's motion
to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed.'22 In a second hearing of
the case, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Mercedes-Benz
USA had sufficient contacts with California to satisfy the re-
quirements for general jurisdiction, and that contacts of Mer-
cedes-Benz USA, as Daimler's agent, could be imputed to Daimler
for jurisdictional purposes. 22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Daimler was not amenable
to suit in California for claims arising in Argentina based on acts
of its Argentinian subsidiary because its contacts in the forum
were insufficient.'24 The Court explained that California was nei-
ther the state of incorporation nor the principal place of business
of Daimler's U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA.' Moreover,
the corporation's affiliations with the state were insufficient to
render it essentially at home in California."6 The Court went on
to say that "the place of incorporation and principal place of busi-
117. Id. at 751.
118. Id. at 751-52.
119. Id. at 752.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 753; Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir.
2011).
124. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753, 762.
125. Id. at 761.
126. Id. at 762.
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ness are 'paradig[m] ... bases for general jurisdiction"' as "[t]hose
affiliations have the virtue of being unique-that is, each ordinar-
ily indicates only one place-as well as easily ascertainable."'27
The Court also noted that a corporation can indeed be consid-
ered essentially at home in a forum that is not its state of incor-
poration nor its principal place of business, thus resolving the
question left open from Goodyear; however, that issue was not
reached under the facts of Daimler."' Accordingly, the California
courts did not have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the de-
fendant corporation."' However, the Court did not articulate the
precise circumstances under which an exceptional case would
arise.
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the outcome but disagreed with
how the majority arrived at the determination that California
lacked jurisdiction over Daimler."' She wrote separately to ex-
press her concern that the majority opinion reflected an analysis
of general jurisdiction that placed too much weight on the propor-
tionality of contacts with a particular forum as compared to other
states. 13 She stated that the proportionality rationale does not
contemplate "that Daimler's contacts with California are too few,
but that its contacts with other forums are too many.""' Justice
Sotomayor also noted that the majority seemed to consider Daim-
ler "too big for general jurisdiction" because its contacts with Cal-
ifornia were extensive, but its contacts with other forums were
similarly too great, allowing it to be excluded from jurisdiction in
California.
133
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the general ju-
risdiction analysis ought to consider the reasonableness factors
127. Id. at 760 (quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction,
66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 (1988)).
128. Id. at 761 n.19.
129. Id. at 762.
130. Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 764 ("[The Court does not dispute that the presence of multiple offices,
the direct distribution of thousands of products accounting for billions of dollars in sales,
and continuous interaction with customers throughout a State would be enough to support
the exercise of general jurisdiction over some businesses. Daimler is just not one of those
businesses, the Court concludes, because its California contacts must be viewed in the con-
text of its extensive 'nationwide and worldwide' operations.").
132. Id.
133. Id.
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articulated in precedential specific jurisdiction cases."' This anal-
ysis would call for balancing the burden to the defendant, the in-
terest of the plaintiff, judicial systematic efficiency, the interest of
the state, and the interests of sister states.'35 Ultimately, Justice
Sotomayor agreed that the California court could not exercise
personal jurisdiction over Daimler because the court of another
nation was a more appropriate forum to hear the case.'36
D. Reaction of the Lower Courts
By applying the principles articulated in Goodyear and Daim-
ler, courts are more often than not striking down the exercise of
general jurisdiction over corporations.'37 However, there is cur-
rently a split among the courts regarding whether a corporation
consents to personal jurisdiction in a forum on all matters by reg-
istering to do business and appointing an agent for service of pro-
cess in that forum.' So far, courts have not been presented with
an exceptional case where the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum were so continuous and systematic that it could be consid-
ered at home there, despite its principal place of business and
state of incorporation being in another forum.
In Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, the Supreme Court of Delaware
held that an out-of-state defendant corporation was not amenable
to suit in the forum for claims of wrongful exposure to asbestos. 39
The court reasoned that the cause of action arose outside the fo-
rum, and the defendant could not be considered at home in Dela-
134. See id. at 765. 'The Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that the reasonable-
ness prong does in fact apply in the general jurisdiction context." Id. at 764 n.1.
135. Id. at 764-65; see also id. at 762 n.20 (rejecting the balancing approach that the
concurrence suggests and explaining that the reasonableness factors articulated by the
court in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987), are only appli-
cable in the specific jurisdiction analysis).
136. Id. at 765.
137. See, e.g., Farber v. Tennant Truck Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (E.D. Pa.
2015) (holding the exercise of general jurisdiction was improper because "[i]f Tennant's
activities 'sufficed to allow adjudication of this [Illinois] -rooted case' in Pennsylvania, 'the
same global reach would presumably be available in every other State' in which Tennant's
revenue, number of pick-ups and drop-offs, and amount of highway travel are sizable") (ci-
tation omitted).
138. Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer's Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and
General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1612-13
(2015).
139. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 128 (Del. 2016).
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ware because "[i]t has never had a corporate office in Delaware,
does not conduct its board or shareholder meetings in this state,
and does not have any officers here.""14
However, the corporation had employees in Delaware, sold
products from its stores in Delaware, and generated revenue in
Delaware.141 Applying the proportionality scheme presented in
Daimler, the court decided this activity was insufficient to exer-
cise jurisdiction because the proportion of the corporation's activi-
ty that occurred in Delaware was less than one percent of its
overall business.
142
Finally, even though the corporation was registered to do busi-
ness in Delaware and had a designated agent for service of pro-
cess, the court explained that "Delaware's registration statutes
must be read as a requirement that a[n out-of-state] corporation
must appoint a registered agent to accept service of process, but
not as a broad consent to personal jurisdiction in any cause of ac-
tion, however unrelated to the [out-of-state] corporation's activi-
ties in Delaware."'4 3 The opinion discussed the conflict among the
courts regarding registration in the forum state, but maintained
that "the majority of federal courts that have considered the issue
of whether consent by registration remains a constitutional basis
for general jurisdiction after Daimler have taken the position that
we adopt.'4 4
Likewise, in Brown v. CBS Corp., the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut granted the defendant corpo-
ration's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over
claims arising out of injuries from asbestos exposure.'4 The court
explained that, pursuant to Connecticut's registration require-
ments, the corporation was deemed to have consented to personal
jurisdiction there, so long as it did not offend the Due Process
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 127-29. But see Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Mylan Inc., No. 14-777-RGA, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31812, at *6-8 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2015) (holding consent by registration in
compliance with Delaware law was sufficient to exercise general jurisdiction "follow[ing]
Acorda and Forest Labs."); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14-508-LPS,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23215, at *8-9 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding consent to general
jurisdiction through required registration remains a valid exercise of jurisdiction).
144. Genuine Parts Co., 137 A.3d at 145.
145. Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 391 (D. Conn. 2014).
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Clause.146 The court then applied an analysis for general jurisdic-
tion and found that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due
process because the defendant was not essentially at home in the
forum.
4 7
The defendant had employees at four different locations in
Connecticut, paid state corporate income tax on revenue earned,
and maintained workers' compensation insurance policies for its
employees in the forum.' Finally, the corporation was registered
to do business in Connecticut and had designated an agent for
service of process. 1'9 The court stated that consenting to general
jurisdiction by registration pursuant to a long-arm statute did not
end the inquiry. 5 ' Courts must still determine whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction comports with due process, and registration to
do business in the forum is not dispositive.''
The Court then engaged in the due process, essentially at home
analysis. Once again, because the activity was less than 1 percent
of the corporation's total revenue, the court decided this was a
"relatively trivial amount."'' The court compared the amount of
contacts of the defendant corporation with those of the defendant
in Daimler and determined that the contacts were even fewer in
this case; thus the corporation could not be found to be at home in
the forum.
Some courts disagree about the impact of Goodyear and Daim-
ler on the personal jurisdiction analysis when a traditional basis
for jurisdiction is established. The traditional basis in question is
consent. In the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, there appears to be a split even among the judges on
the issue of consent by registration following Daimler. In Astra-
Zeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court held that
administrative statutes "merely outline procedures for doing
business in the state; compliance does not amount to consent to
146. Id. at 396.
147. See id. at 397.
148. Id. at 391-92.
149. Id. at 394.
150. Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 397-98.
153. Id. at 398-99.
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jurisdiction or waiver of due process." '154 The court denied the de-
fendant corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction, finding specific jurisdiction on other grounds. 5 However,
despite its having registered to do business in Delaware, the
court held the defendant had not consented to jurisdiction be-
cause it could not be deemed essentially at home in the forum,
and it was incorporated and had its principal place of business in
West Virginia. 15
6
Alternatively, in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharma-
ceuticals Inc., the same court held that "due process may also be
satisfied by consent of the party asserting a lack of personal ju-
risdiction,""' 7 rather than by a finding of sufficient minimum con-
tracts. The opinion recognized that another member of the same
court had recently reached a contrary conclusion, but reasoned
that the holding in Daimler did not eliminate consent as a basis
for jurisdiction."'
It seems an odd result that while there is not general jurisdiction
over a corporation in every state in which the corporation does busi-
ness, there may be general jurisdiction over a corporation in every
state in which that corporation appoints an agent to accept service of
process as part of meeting the requirements to register to do busi-
ness in that state. But if consent remains a valid basis on which per-
sonal jurisdiction may arise-and the undersigned Judge concludes
that Daimler did not change the law on this point-then this result,
though odd, is entirely permissible.' 59
III. ANALYSIS
The separation of the two notions-fairness and predictabil-
ity-leads to some circular reasoning because the notions often
overlap. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend how the Supreme
Court justifies placing predictability at a premium above fairness
when, in reality, in order for the exercise of jurisdiction to be fair,
it must also be predictable. A case where a plaintiff cannot pre-
154. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 557 (D. Del. 2014).
155. Id. at 560.
156. See id. at 552, 554-55.
157. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D. Del.
2015).
158. Id. at 590-91.
159. Id. at 591.
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dict where a corporate defendant could be hailed to court lacks
fairness. Moreover, if the exercise of jurisdiction were unpredict-
able to either the plaintiff or the defendant, does that not render
the situation unfair?
In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a de-
fendant is proper, notions of fairness to all parties in a dispute
most likely will yield to predictability for the defendant because
the new standard is more restrictive. The essentially at home
standard prioritizes predictability above other policy justifica-
tions offered in the past. However, consider whether it is predict-
able to plaintiffs that a corporation could not be brought to court
in a particular state when the cause of action did not arise there,
but they perceive the presence of the corporation through market-
ing and sales in the state. Such a circumstance may indeed sur-
prise a plaintiff.
A. Fairness Rationale
The discussion of the fairness rationale must begin with the
question: fair to whom? International Shoe recognized that to
comport with due process, the exercise of jurisdiction should be
fair.' The Court articulated that the minimum contacts test
could not be a "quantitative" test that measured a single factor to
determine whether jurisdiction was proper.'61 Rather, the Court
explained that in each instance, a court must weigh a variety of
factors, and consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate in light of a
particular case with a unique set of facts. 6 ' International Shoe
placed fairness at the forefront of the jurisdiction analysis, con-
sidering the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the states. 6 3
The minimum contacts analysis was applied in many cases in
the context of specific jurisdiction, but only two Supreme Court
decisions have been handed down since International Shoe in the
160. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
161. See id. at 319 ("[Tlhe criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, can-
not be simply mechanical or quantitative.").
162. See id. at 318-19.
163. See id. at 316, 319.
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realm of general jurisdiction before Goodyear and Daimler.' Pri-
or to these most recent cases, lower courts found systematic and
continuous commercial activity in a forum was sufficient to estab-
lish general jurisdiction.'65 However, under the essentially at
home standard, such commercial activity is found to be insuffi-
cient."' 6
The Court appears to consider the fairness to the defendant be-
ing called to suit, not the extent of fairness to the plaintiff or the
state. For instance, the balance of conveniences test endorsed in
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Daimler contemplates wheth-
er jurisdiction would be fair to both parties involved in the action,
as well as in consideration of the state's interests.'67 Justice Gins-
berg, writing for the majority, explicitly rejected the balance of
conveniences test in the context of general jurisdiction, thus re-
buffing consideration of fairness to parties or interests other than
those belonging to the defendant.'68
If the proper analysis for exercising general jurisdiction consid-
ers fairness to the state, such an analysis would inherently in-
clude the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale and the inter-
state federalism rationale. Both rationales look to the interests of
the state to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a
particular defendant is proper. These rationales consider fairness
to the state as part of the totality of the circumstances to deter-
mine whether it is fair to call a particular defendant to the fo-
rum's courts. The Supreme Court has not stressed the importance
of these rationales in its recent decisions on jurisdiction.
Under the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale, when a
defendant receives benefits from a forum state, he should be sub-
ject to the burden of appearing as a defendant in the state's
courts.' That is, "by invoking the benefits and protections of the
forum's laws, the nonresident defendant is seen as 'consenting' to
164. See HAY ETAL., supra note 47, at 409.
165. See, e.g., Gater.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2003)
(exercising general jurisdiction over defendant based on its solicitation of sales to forum
residents).
166. See supra Part II.D.
167. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764-65 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring).
168. See id. at 762 n.20.
169. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987).
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being sued there., 17' A corporation that "exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, [and therefore] enjoys the
benefits and protection of the laws of that state" may then have
obligations arising from the exercise of that privilege. 7'
The interstate federalism rationale addresses the concern that
when a state's power reaches beyond its boundaries, it impedes
the power of the sister states. 172 This concern appeared in the ear-
ly case law dealing with the ability of corporations to engage in
business in one state when incorporated in a different state.7 3
The rationale was considered most significantly in Pennoyer,
where the Court held that the state could not exercise jurisdiction
over an individual while he was in another state. 74 However, as
commerce began to cross state borders with more regularity, the
view of the power of a corporation expanded as well. 7' The Court
recognized in its decision in International Shoe that it is possible
for an entity to have presence in more states than an individu-
al." 6 Additionally, the commercial realities of modern commerce
may be eroding the significance courts give this consideration in
determining jurisdiction. In the age of the internet, where inter-
state commerce is the norm rather than the exception, courts ap-
pear to be less concerned with overreaching its powers into other
states when it considers its authority over a corporation that is
carrying on business in a significant number of states.
However, should reciprocal benefits and burdens and interstate
federalism concerns be considered in the case of a corporation
that is based in another country? Some argue that the recent de-
cisions restricting the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations in U.S. courts are a "source of protection for non-United
States defendants, albeit one which is likely unavailable to Unit-
ed States-based defendants" when called to suit in other na-
tions. 77
170. Id.
171. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
172. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
173. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
174. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722, 736.
175. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17; Benish, supra note 138, at 1616-17.
176. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S at 316-17.
177. James L. Stengel & Kristina Pieper Trautmann, Determining United States Ju-
risdiction Over Transnational Litigation, 35 REV. OF LITIG. 1, 39 (2016).
2017] 1201
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. Predictability Rationale
Predictability is emerging as the driving force in determina-
tions of general jurisdiction. This rationale has been offered re-
peatedly in jurisdictional jurisprudence. "Due Process requires
that the defendant be given adequate notice of the suit" prior to
the exercise of general jurisdiction.171 "By ensuring the 'orderly
administration of the laws,"' the Due Process Clause "gives a de-
gree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential de-
fendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.
179
If a corporate defendant carries out sufficient activity in a fo-
rum, it can expect to be called to suit there for claims related to
its activities. Moreover, if those activities are extensive, the de-
fendant can predict that it may be called to suit there on other
matters arising outside the forum. In the past, a corporation's ac-
tivities were measured by business conducted in the forum, typi-
cally including a combination of purchases, sales, contracts, and
similar business contacts. The question that arises after Good-
year and Daimler is whether significant revenues alone will ever
be sufficient to exercise general jurisdiction. If not, then there is
the potential that a foreign corporation that has no physical pres-
ence anywhere in the United States, but generates large revenue
from sales to U.S. customers, is not amenable to suit in any state
on claims unrelated to those sales.
This exact scenario may now, following Daimler, be predictable
to a defendant. Arguably, it will not be predictable to the average
plaintiff who sees the presence of a corporation through market-
ing and sales without an awareness of where the corporation is at
home. Moreover, the Court considers predictability, just like fair-
ness, from the perspective of defendants and does not consider
what may be predictable from the vantage point of plaintiffs.
178. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
179. Id. at 297 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
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1. Paradigm Forums: Comparing an Individual's Domicile with a
Corporation's Principal Place of Business and State of
Incorporation
The holdings in Goodyear and Daimler limit the exercise of
general jurisdiction to a corporation's principal place of business
or state of incorporation, unless the facts present an exceptional
case.' This restriction is similar to that in place for the exercise
of jurisdiction over individuals. An individual indicates general
submission to a state's powers by establishing domicile,'' and ac-
cordingly, is amenable to suit for all matters in this forum. 2 This
part will explore the rationale behind this jurisdictional test for
individuals and determine whether the justifications could apply
to how the Court is setting up a corporation's "homes" to be simi-
larly limited. It will also consider whether such a justification
makes sense in light of the ability of a corporation, as an artificial
entity, to be present in a different way than natural persons.
In the case of an individual, domicile is established when a per-
son enters a state with the intent to make that state her home.
8 3
Intent can be inferred by an individual's actions and assertions.'
For example, obtaining a driver's license, purchasing property,
paying taxes, registering to vote, maintaining employment, or re-
ceiving state benefits could indicate an intent to remain in a par-
ticular state.1 8 Domicile is the last location where these two fac-
tors-presence and intent to remain-coincided.8 6 Moreover, once
domicile is established, it can only be changed by acquiring a new
domicile.8 7
Alternatively, in the case of a corporation, the principal place of
business is determined by "the place where a corporation's offic-
180. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927-28 (2011).
181. See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (analyzing the meaning of
an individual's domicile in the context of subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship).
182. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
183. See Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399.
184. See Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874).
185. See id.
186. Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399.
187. Id. at 1399-1400.
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ers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." '188
The nerve center test determines a corporation's principal place
of business based on its headquarters, assuming the headquar-
ters is the center of control, and not simply an office where the
corporation holds its board meetings to which directors have to
travel to attend.189 The Supreme Court offered the predictability
rationale to support the establishment of this test for purposes of
determining a corporation's version of domicile in the context of
subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship."9' The
Court stated that "[s]imple jurisdictional rules also promote
greater predictability. Predictability is valuable to corporations
making business and investment decisions. 191
Similarly, the selection of a state of incorporation is a conscious
and calculated decision for most businesses.'92 Indeed, a corpora-
tion gives a great deal of consideration to the choice of law it se-
lects to govern its internal affairs in the process of business plan-
ning.9 ' Some businesses, typically smaller corporations, select the
state of incorporation based on where they intend to carry out
most of their business for convenience and to keep costs low.
94
Large corporations, on the other hand, will opt to incorporate in
the state with the most favorable laws.
95
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court recognized that cor-
porations have an ability to be present that is inherently different
from what is possible for individuals.' 96 Hence, the Court decided
that a measure of contacts was necessary to determine whether a
corporation is amenable to suit in a particular forum.'97
188. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (articulating the nerve center test
to determine the principal place of business in the context of subject matter jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship). There is some disagreement about whether the Court
intended the nerve center test to apply in any context other than in the interpretation of
the diversity statute. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 90, at 148-49.
189. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93.
190. Id. at 94.
191. Id.
192. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 369-70 (1917).
193. Id.
194. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 2010).
195. Id. at 39.
196. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
197. Id. at 317.
1204 [Vol. 51:1179
EXPLORATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CASES
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intend-
ed to be acted upon as though it were a fact .... it is clear that un-
like an individual its 'presence' without, as well as within, the state
of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its be-
half by those who are authorized to act for it.'
98
While the minimum contacts test was the Court's effort to break
away from the restraints of a Pennoyer presence analysis in cases
determining jurisdiction over a corporation, the establishment of
the essentially at home standard signals a return to the same re-
straints, only now prioritizing predictability above other policy
justifications offered in the past.
IV. PREDICTION
The Supreme Court seems to say that predictability overrides
all other justifications, but there are circumstances under which
the Court may-and should-consider the facts of a case excep-
tional. The outcomes of both Goodyear and Daimler did not shock
many people.'99 What shocked the system was dicta from Good-
year introducing the new essentially at home standard and the
paradigm forums. 00 Also, commentators are struggling to grasp
the proportionality scheme and the outright rejection of the bal-
ance of conveniences arising from Daimler.'0 ' The lower courts are
testing the concept of proportionality of business activity to de-
termine a corporation's home and are considering predictability
only from the perspective of the defendant, rather than a balanc-
ing test.20 2
After Goodyear and Daimler, it remains unclear in what cir-
cumstances a court could rule that the commercial activity in a
forum is sufficiently systematic and continuous to consider the
corporation essentially at home. Thus, the one caveat is that all
the benefits of predictability are diminished because the Court
198. Id. at 316 (citing Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930)).
199. See Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities
in Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2014).
200. See id.
201. See Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction,
15 NEV. L.J. 1161, 1162-64 (2015); Kaitlin Hanigan, A Blunder of Supreme Propositions:
General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 48 LOY. L. REV. 291, 301 (2014).
202. See supra Part II.D.
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has yet to determine where else in addition to the paradigm fo-
rums a plaintiff can initiate a case against a corporation. It re-
mains to be seen how the policy justifications offered in the past
should apply to foreign corporations when the cause of action
arises outside the forum.
The predictability rationale's ascension to the forefront of the
jurisdiction analysis will have implications in future litigation.
Moreover, in the case of foreign corporations that do not have a
principal place of business, nor a state of incorporation in the
United States, a different standard may be required in order to be
predictable as well as fair. The Supreme Court Justices may be
waiting for exceptional cases to allow them to determine the type
of activities required to find that a corporation carries on activi-
ties in a forum so systematic and continuous as to make it essen-
tially at home there.
A. Predictability Governs
The Court seems to say that predictability overrides all other
justifications."3 On the one hand, this can be viewed as reasona-
ble. Indeed, if all parties know exactly where the case needs to be
brought, then the plaintiff does not expend time and resources
bringing suit in a forum where the case could not stand. Fur-
thermore, plaintiffs can consider the need to travel to bring suit
as part of the cost of litigation and value a case accordingly.
There is a possibility that this additional consideration could dis-
courage otherwise meritorious claims from being litigated due to
the increased cost. However, a limited selection of forums could
also minimize plaintiff forum shopping, which may increase over-
all efficiency.
Arguably, the Court has left open a narrow window for an exer-
cise of jurisdiction outside of the paradigm forums." 4 The question
remains: if neither purchases nor sales are the appropriate meas-
ure to determine whether a corporation is essentially at home in
a forum, then what is the correct measure? A corporation inter-
acts with states other than its state of incorporation primarily by
203. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
204. Id. at 761 n.19.
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doing business there.2"5 After determining the kind of activity re-
quired, the extent to which those activities must be carried out in
order to render a corporate defendant essentially at home re-
mains undetermined.
The Supreme Court's decisions prioritizing predictability over
justifications offered in the past are reasonable because corpora-
tions operate differently in modern commerce. Particularly in the
case of large corporations that function through various levels of
parent companies and subsidiaries, "changes in the technology of
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth
of interstate business activity" have increased the reach of a mod-
ern corporation."06 The Court today probably recognizes that gen-
eral jurisdiction cannot be so broad and unpredictable as to offend
relations with other nations by exercising jurisdiction over large,
multinational corporations distantly removed from the United
States on matters unrelated to its activities in that state. Howev-
er, the Court also articulated that it is not prepared to rule that
there are only one or two forums in which a corporation may be
subject to jurisdiction.2 7 This shows the Court acknowledged an
opportunity to clarify the evolving law of personal jurisdiction,
but it did not go far enough to establish a bright-line rule.
The Court seems to realize that general jurisdiction cases pre-
sented to it did not demonstrate the necessary facts to establish
such a rule. However, in the interests of predictability, the Court
is likely going to establish such a rule when the proper facts come
before it. Neither the Court nor anyone else can foresee how
technology and globalization will continue to alter the landscape
of business internationally. Indeed, the Court can only decide the
cases that come before it. Thus, the opportunity for adaptability
remains available until a case presents itself involving a corpora-
tion with sufficient contacts in the forum state that it can be con-
sidered at home without the forum being its principal place of
business or state of incorporation. Then, lower federal and state
courts can use the precedent for comparison. An appropriate
205. See FLETCHER, supra note 192, at 820, 820 n.17.
206. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 268-69 (6th ed. 2010) (explaining that the sepa-
ration between a parent corporation and its subsidiary is real, but the subsidiary may act
as an agent for the parent in conducting the parent's business in a forum).
207. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
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precedential case might be one where a corporation does not have
a principal place of business nor a state of incorporation in the
United States and the lack of alternative forums may be consid-
ered in addition to a measure of contacts with a forum. Until cer-
tain facts present themselves to the Court, the essentially at
home standard will remain narrow and somewhat unresolved.
B. Foreign Corporations
In applying the restrictive essentially at home test for general
jurisdiction, the standard may need to be different for foreign
corporations that do not have a principal place of business nor a
state of incorporation in the United States. The Supreme Court
may consider a variation of the standard in a case where there is
no other forum available to hear the case, making the exercise of
jurisdiction necessary.
For example, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
the Court decided a case where it could not classify the exercise of
jurisdiction as either in rem or in personam. °8 The Court deter-
mined that jurisdiction was nonetheless proper, stating that
the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that ex-
ist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervi-
sion of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident.
2
0
9
Thus, the importance of having a forum available to resolve the
matter outweighed the concerns surrounding the proper exercise
of jurisdiction.
Whether the doctrine of necessity exists remains a subject of
debate.21 ° In light of the restrictive essentially at home standard,
there is a strong argument for the development of such a doc-
trine. However, while the Court has discussed the possibility of a
doctrine of necessity, 211 it has yet to embrace it based on the facts
presented in each case where it has been mentioned. For in-
208. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13, 320 (1950)
(determining that New York state courts had personal jurisdiction over trust beneficiar-
ies).
209. Id. at 313.
210. HAY ETAL., supra note 47, at 402.
211. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984).
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stance, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court stated that "[t]his case
does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question [of
jurisdiction] ...when no other forum is available to the plain-
tiff.
212
Similarly, in Helicopteros, the Court concluded that the plain-
tiffs failed to carry their burden to merit a ruling based on juris-
diction by necessity.21 The Court explained that the record did
not support the plaintiffs assertion that there was no alternative
forum, thus the Court refused to adopt such a "potentially far-
reaching modification of existing law. 21 4 Commentators have con-
sidered whether the Perkins decision, where the Court held that
jurisdiction was proper over a foreign corporation, is an example
of jurisdiction by necessity, although this was not articulated in
the opinion. 5 Likewise, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the
Court stated that "'the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief," could be considered in appropriate cases "to
establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts., 216 This indicates that a lack of alternative
avenues for a plaintiff to obtain relief may be considered in de-
termining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is
proper.
The discussions in past decisions on the doctrine of jurisdiction
by necessity have deliberately left open the possibility to apply
such a notion in future cases. It does appear, however, that the
circumstance would be narrow. For instance, the Court in Heli-
copteros did not state with certainty that the case could indeed be
brought by plaintiffs in Columbia or Peru; rather, it said that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the case could not be brought in
either nation.2 1 '7 This phrasing indicates that the Court will pre-
sume the case could be heard in another court unless the plaintiff
proves other options are not available. Moreover, a finding of ju-
risdiction by necessity may be impacted if the only other forums
available were governed by vastly different law in other nations,
212. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
213. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 n.13.
214. Id.
215. HAY ET AL., supra note 47, at 410.
216. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
217. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 n.13.
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making it certain that the plaintiffs could not assert-let alone
prevail on-their claim.
C. Exceptional Cases
In Daimler, the Supreme Court stated that there remains a
possibility that "a corporation's operations in a forum other than
its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business
may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the cor-
poration at home in that State," but that would be an "exceptional
case." '218 The Court did not elaborate as to what would be viewed
as exceptional because the facts of the case at hand did not re-
quire further analysis.219 Lower courts are left to speculate
whether exceptional facts are present in any given case where the
defendant is called to court for a cause of action arising elsewhere
and the forum is neither its principal place of business nor its
state of incorporation. Indeed, it remains unresolved when a cor-
porate defendant can be essentially at home outside of the para-
digm forums. What set of facts is the Supreme Court waiting for
to clarify this standard?
One possibility is that a case may be presented where the oper-
ations of a corporation evolved and its business became concen-
trated in a state where it was not incorporated, nor where it es-
tablished its principal place of business.2 The Court could decide
to disregard the nerve center test for the principal place of busi-
ness test and simply call this new state the corporation's princi-
pal place of business based on the level of activity relative to oth-
er states.221 Using an alternative measure to determine principal
place of business would allow the Court to maintain jurisdiction
in a paradigm forum while still taking into account actual activi-
ties conducted in the forum. This scenario would still limit the fo-
rums where a corporate defendant is at home.
Jurisdiction may also be proper in a case where a foreign cor-
poration engages in most of its activity in a single state of the
218. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 n.19 (2014).
219. Id.
220. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 90, at 151-52.
221. Id. at 152, 152 n.242.
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United States.222 This would limit the analysis to comparing con-
tacts in the forum state with other states, rather than the propor-
tionality of business carried on by the corporation overall. This
scenario could arise in a case where a foreign corporation main-
tains an outsized presence in a particular state by establishing a
factory or distribution center in the forum.222
Alternatively, the Court may determine general jurisdiction is
proper in a case where a foreign defendant neither maintains a
principal place of business nor a state of incorporation in the
United States, but conducts most of its business activity overall
in the United States. 24 This approach would focus on the propor-
tion of the corporation's activity in the United States compared to
the rest of the world, rather than focusing on its activity in pro-
portion to the other states.225
CONCLUSION
Predictability reigns as the jurisdiction rationale at the fore-
front of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, surpassing
considerations of fairness to plaintiffs and the interests of the
states. The restrictive essentially at home standard for determin-
ing whether a court has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over
a corporation in a claim that arose outside the forum parallel re-
strictions placed in the case of individuals establishing domicile.
A corporation's equivalent for domicile are its principal place of
business, its state of incorporation, and an unknown forum where
the level of contacts-and surrounding facts-determines that the
case is exceptional.
The restrictive essentially at home standard may warrant the
emergence of jurisdiction by necessity in a case where there are
no alternative forums available to a plaintiff because the corpora-
tion has its principal place of business and its state of incorpora-
222. Id. at 152.
223. Id. at 153. But see generally Gliklad v. Bank Hapoalim B.M., No. 155195/2014
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (denying general jurisdiction over a foreign bank with its place of in-
corporation and principal place of business in Israel, even though the defendant bank had
a New York branch that was "the center of its operations in the United States, where it
actively conducts business").
224. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 90, at 153.
225. See id.
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tion outside of the United States. In all likelihood, disagreements
will emerge among the lower courts as they continue to speculate
whether exceptional facts are present in any given case presented
outside the paradigm forums. Thus, a future case is likely to be
taken up by the Supreme Court in order to clarify what facts pre-
sent an exceptional case where the exercise of general jurisdiction
comports with due process outside the paradigm forums. Until
such a decision is handed down, the essentially at home standard
will remain unresolved.
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